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Appellate Court Articulation of General
Standards of Conduct: Effective Guid-
ance versus Impotent Verbalism*
ARTHUR WARREN PHELPS '
Speculation has been current concerning the process
whereby standards of conduct are articulated by appellate
courts. There has been little examination of the case
material for the purpose of determining objectively how
much of that which is usually included under the heading
of articulation is effective in the final disposal of cases. It
is strange that this should be true of a system of law, such
as the English system, which so definitely associates gen-
erality with justice.
The present study has been attempted in order to gain
a little insight into how appellate courts give meaning to
general standards, and to test, if possible, the effectiveness
of opinions in procuring a chosen result. When general
standards are used there really is no norm for the matter
in question if the "path of words" selected by the appellate
courts to animate such standards is no more than impotent
verbalizing. It is, therefore, of importance to both judges
and lawyers to kmow how much of that which passes under
the name of definition has any true significance.
* This article was written at Columbia University under Professor Karl
Llewellyn in a seminar on The Theory of Legal Institutions. The writer wishes
to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Llewellyn for his valuable criti-
cism of this essay without committing him to approval of any of the views
herein expressed.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Ada, Ohio.
1931 A. B. Washington & Lee University; 1932 A. M. Ohio State University;
1935 LL. B. University of Cincinnati; 1940 LL. M. Columbia University.
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Although the problem is common to all jurisdictions,
the decisions interpreting the California guest statute were
for several reasons taken as the subject-matter of investi-
gation. In that state a statute had been passed setting forth
a general standard intended by the legislature to produce
a certain result. This result was not accomplished because
of the way in which the appellate courts handled the prob-
lem. There followed a change in the statute which set
forth the same standard in different words. This amended
statute did procure, at least in part, the result intended by
the legislature. From the decisions interpreting the two
statutory phrases used to state the standard, valuable in-
formation can be secured concerning the way in which ap-
pellate courts tend to articulate standards, as well as the
way in which they must articulate them to get the results
which are sought.
The guest statute was also selected because it contains
a relatively simple standard, in dealing with which the
judges have a fair chance of understanding the broader
implications of what they are doing. In addition the situa-
tion is one in which policy elements are of great impor-
tance, and the play of public policy and special interests can
be seen. Finally, a reasonable number of cases appear in
the appellate courts over a comparatively short period of
time. This gives sufficient material for useful observa-
tions concerning the nature of the judicial process.
It is realized that there are distinct limitations upon the
type of study attempted here. Nevertheless, a casual
glance at the figures contained in the next two sections can-
not fail to be suggestive. New departures for thinking in
matters relating to general standards can be found.
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DISPOSITION BY THE COURTS OF APPEALS OF CASES
INVOLVING "GROSS NEGLIGENCE"
In 1929 the legislature of California provided that a
guest riding in a motor vehicle should have no right of
recovery against the owner or driver or person responsible
for the operation of the motor vehicle except where the
injury to or death of the guest resulted from the intoxica-
tion, wilful misconduct, or gross negligence of the owner,
driver, or person responsible for the operation of the
vehicle.'
Opinions were written in forty cases by the appellate
courts of California defining the limits of the phrase
"gross negligence." '  In five, judgments on motion for
nonsuit or directed verdict were appealed.' One was re-
'Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 Pac. 62 (1930).
'A number of these cases were decided after the enactment of the amend-
ment eliminating gross negligence from the statute, but they were controlled
by the earlier statute. Care, therefore, should be exercised in drawing con-
clusions.
' (Compare the following cases with the ones discussed in footnote 9.)
Going upgrade rounding a left curve defendant was momentarily blinded
by the sun. Before he could recover his vision his car drew to the left side
and into an embankment. It was held that the trial court was justified in
holding as a matter of law that the claim of gross negligence was unsupported.
Binns v. Standen, 118 Cal. App. 625, 5 P. (2d) 637 (1931).
Car overturned when rear tire blew out. Speed fifty-five miles per hour.
Claim that defendant was in depleted physical condition from drinking every
night for three or four nights before starting on the trip in question at 4 A. M.
No evidence of intoxication on the day of the accident. Waterman v. Lieder-
man, GO P. (2d) 881 (Cal. App. 1936).
Driving home at 2 A. MA. from a basketball game the defendant fell asleep
at the wheel and ran into an oncoming automobile. The defendant had no
prior indication that he might doze. Action of the trial court in nonsuiting the
plaintiff was affirmed. Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal. (2d) 504, 42 P. (2d) 59
(1935) ; but see: Cooper v. Kellogg, 31 P. (2d) 797 (Cal. App. 1934).
As defendant passed a car it turned abruptly to the left. Defendant
swerved into soft dirt on the left and overturned. Simpson v. Steinhoff, 21
P. (2d) 960 (Cal. App. 193.3).
Automobile was stopped at a crossing to permit a freight train to pass on a
side track. After the freight had passed, the defendant drove over the side
track and was struck by an approaching train on the main line. Defendant
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versed. Of the thirty-five cases tried on the facts, the facts
were found by the jury in twenty-three,4 by the trial court
in twelve.5 There were thirty judgments for the plaintiff:
nineteen on jury verdicts; eleven on court findings. It is
significant that but three of these judgments were re-
versed.6  Only one was reversed on the ground that the
looked, but his view was blocked by the outgoing train. He listened but did
not hear because of the noise of the freight. The trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant. It was held on appeal that the facts constituted a prinza
fade case of gross negligence. Smellie v. Southern P. Co., 297 Pac. 343 (Cal.
1930) ; 212 Cal. 540, 299 Pac. 529 (1931) (the only judgment of nonsuit re-
versed).
Taylor v. Cockrell, 116 Cal. App. 596, 3 P. (2d) 16 (1931) ; Meighan v.
Baker, 119 Cal. App. 582, 6 P. (2d) 1015 (1932); O'Nellion v. Haynes, 122
'Cal. App. 329, 9 P. (2d) 853 (1932) ; Dahl v. Spotts, 128 Cal. App. 133, 16 P.
(2d) 774 (1932) ; Anderson v. Ott, 127 Cal. App. 122, 15 P. (2d) 526 (1932) ;
Johnson v. Ostrom, 16 P. (2d) 794 (Cal. App. 1932) ; Dodds v. Gifford, 16 P.
(2d) 279 (Cal. App. 1932); Nelson v. Westergaard, 130 Cal. App. 79, 19 P.
(2d) 867 (1933); Gardiner v. Hogue, 131 Cal. App. 254, 20 P. (24) 957
(1933) ; Redwing v. Moncravie, 21 P. (2d) 986 (Cal. App. 1933) ; Walters v.
Du Four, 132 Cal. App. 72, 22 P. (2d) 259 (1933); Nichols v. Smith, 28 P.
(2d) 693 (Cal. App. 1934); Smith v. Wagner, 30 P. (2d) 1020 (Cal. App.
1934) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 137 Cal. App. 701, 31 P. (2d) 237 (1934) ; Fenster-
macher v. Johnson, 138 Cal. App. 691, 32 P. (2<) 1106 (1934); Harlan v.
Taylor, 33 P. (2d) 422 (Cal. App. 1934) ; Ohlson v. Frazier, 2 Cal. App. (2d)
708, 39 P. (2d) 429 (1934); Rees v. 'Chase, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 1"27, 38 P. (2d)
819 (1934) ; De Martini v. Wheatley, 126 Cal. App. 230, 14 P. (2d) 869 (1932) ;
Stotts v. Blickle, 220 Cal. 225, 30 P. (2d) 392, (1934) ; Armacost v. Wilberg,
42 P. (2d) 393 (Cal. App. 1935); Stoneburner v. Theodoratos, 30 P. (2d)
1001 ('Cal. App. 1934); Baeff v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 43 P. (2d) 575
('Cal. App. 1935).
'Malone v. Clemow, 111 'Cal. App. 13, 295 Pac. 70 (1931); Kastel v.
Stieber, 215 Cal. 37, 8 P. (2d) 474 (1932); McKinley v. Dalton, 17 P. (24)
160 (Cal. App. 1932) ; Manica v. Smith, 18 P. (2d) 117 (Cal. App. 1933), Sub-
sequent opinion, 33 P. (2d) 418 (1933) ; Hagan v. Metzger, 20 P. (2d) 117
(Cal. App. 1933) ; Castro v. Singh, 131 Cal. App. 106, 21 P. (2d) 169 (1933) ;
Binford v. Purcell, 2 Cal. App. (24) 87, 37 P. (2d) 73 (1934) ; Bettencourt
v. Oliveria, 3 'Cal. App. (2d) 325, 39 P. (2d) 243 (1934) ; Goodwin v. Goodwin,
5 Cal. App. (2d) 644, 43 P. (2d) 332 (1935) ; Sumner v. Edmunds, 21 P. (2d)
159 (Cal. App. 1933); Lincoln v. Quick, 24 P. (2d) 245 (Cal. App. 1933);
Stewart v. Wagenbach, 47 P. (2d) 267 ('Cal. App. 1935).
6 Lincoln v. Quick, 24 P. (2d) 245 (Cal. App. 1933) [insufficient evidence to
show gross negligence]; Redwing v. Moncravie, 21 P. (24) 986 (Cal. App.
1933) [erroneous negligence]; Nichols v. Smith, 28 P. (2d) 693 (Cal. App.
1934) [improper injection of insurance and faulty allegation in petition].
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evidence was insufficient to show gross negligence. The
action of two trial courts in granting motions for a new
trial, where the jury found for the plaintiff, was sustained.!
There were five judgments for the defendant in the cases
tried on the facts: four on jury verdicts; one on court
findings.' Motions for a new trial were granted in two
of the four cases in which the jury found for the defend-
ant. These rulings were sustained on appeal. The judg-
ments for the defendant in the other three cases were
affirmed.
In considering the thirty-five cases tried on the facts,
almost every court of appeals stated that the degree of care
required under the circumstances was a question of fact
for the court or jury and not a question of law. Many of
these cases would seem indistinguishable from those of
negligence,' assuming, of course, that "gross negligence"
Johnson v. Ostrom, 16 P. (2d) 794 (Cal. App. 1932) ; Ohlson v. Frazier,
2 Cal. App. (2d) 708, 39 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. App. 1934).
Stewart v. Wagenback, 47 P. (2d) 267 (Cal. App. 1935) [only court find-
ing for defendant]; Armacost v. Wilberg, 42 P. (2d) 393 (Cal. App. 1935) ;
Harlan v. Taylor, 33 P. (2d) 422 (Cal. App. 1934); Dodds v. Gifford, 16
P. (2d) 279 (Cal. App. 1932); Baeff v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 43 P. (2d)
575 (Cal. App. 1935) [granting of motion for new trial affirmed in last two
cases].
'On a clear night while driving from 30 to 35 miles an hour the defendant
ran into the back of a parked truck whose red light could be seen for at least
200 feet. The street was straight with no interfering traffic. The defendant
had driven from Burbank, California to Oakland in one day. There was no
explanation of why she did not see the parked truck. It was held that there
was an utter lack of slight care, and since the trial court had determined there
was gross negligence "we are powerless to interfere with its conclusions."
Malone v. Clemow, 111 Cal. App. 13, 295 Pac. 70 (1931).
Defendant travelling in a fog at 25 miles per hour met a car weaving to
the wrong side of the road. Defendant swerved to his left to go off the road
where he claimed he could see. The other car returned to its right side of the
road and a collision resulted. The court held that the evidence was sufficient
to show an "entire failure to exercise care-a complete lack of even slight
diligence to avoid injuring others." Goodwin v. Goodwin, 5 Cal. App. (2d)
644, 43 P. (2d) 332 (1935).
Two public highways crossed a blind intersection. The defendant saw
that the car which struck him was farther from the intersection than he was
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when set forth in a statute can be something more than a
"vituperative epithet." " It is clear from an examination
of these cases that the courts of appeals either would not or
could not articulate the standard of gross negligence be-
yond the definition established by the Supreme Court of
California that gross negligence was "want of slight
diligence." 11 There had been a judgment for the plaintiff
in every case appealed except five. Three judgments for
the plaintiff were reversed, only one on the basis of the in-
sufficiency of the facts to show gross negligence. From
this it would appear that the standard of "gross negli-
gence" created a juror's paradise in which their notions
of liability were supreme.
and speeded up to make a safe crossing. His car was struck near the rear seat.
No anxiety was expressed by the plaintiff. It was held that the question was
properly one for the jury. Anderson v. Ott, 15 P. (2d) 526 (Cal. App. 1932).
See also, De Martini v. Wheatley, 126 Cal. App. 230, 14 P. (2d) 869 (1932).
Defendant driving 45-50 early in the morning struck a cement base of a
railroad signal on a curve. Meighan v. Baker, 119 Cal. App. 582, 6 P. (2A)
1015 (1932).
While descending a 13% grade defendant lost control of his car because
of defective brakes. He began the descent in second gear but finding this in-
sufficient to hold the vehicle, attempted to shift to low gear. No attempt was
made to use the emergency brake. It was held a question for the jury to de-
termine whether the defendant was guilty of gross negligence. Gardiner v.
Hogue, 131 Cal. App. 254, 20 P. (2d) 957 (1933).
Curve having sixty-six degree angle entered at speed of 50-60 miles an
hour. Smith v. Wagner, 30 P. (2d) 1020 (1934).
o ,... in the construction of statutes which specifically refer to gross
negligence, that phrase is sometimes construed as equivalent to reckless dis-
regard. ." REsTATRmENT, ToRTs (1934) §2832, special note.
"Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 Pac. 62 (1930). The court states:
"The term 'gross negligence' has been defined as 'the want of slight diligence,'
as an entire failure to exercise care, or to exercise so slight a degree of care as
to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the things and welfare of
others'. and as 'that -want of care which would raise a presumption of the
conscious indifference to consequences.'
A trial court unsuccessfully advanced the theory that the defendant could
not be found guilty of gross negligence if he did merely what an ordinarily
inattentive and thoughtless person would have done in the same or similar
situation. Baeff v. Kleiber Motor Truck 'Co., 43 P. (2d) 575 (Cal. App. 1935).
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Some of the courts seemed to recognize that jury de-
termination of the existence of gross negligence, uncon-
trolled by the courts except by broad definition, would
cause the new statute to make no practical change in the
direction of limiting the liability of owners and drivers
(sotto voce, insurance companies) to guests. The court in
Ieighan v. Baker, said:
"The term 'gross negligence' is incapable of precise definition
and its application and use may in some cases lead to unsatisfactory
results, even to the extent of nullifying the limitation of liability con-
tained in the statute." 12
The courts, nevertheless, did not create any rules to
guide trial courts in directing verdicts, or even indicate to
such courts that their power in this respect, enhanced by
the statutory standard, was greater than that customarily
exercised in negligence cases.
DISPOSITION BY COURTS OF APPEALS OF CASES
INVOLVING "WILFUL MISCONDUCT"
It was soon "apparent to the legislature" that if the
courts were not going to assume some responsibility for
defining the limits of "gross negligence," further legisla-
tion would be necessary in order to procure any appreciable
change in the judgments rendered in guest cases. The
California guest statute was therefore amended in August,
1931, by removing the words "gross negligence" from the
statutory definition. This made it necessary for a guest
to prove, before he could recover, that he was injured by
the wilfud misconduct of the defendant. 3
Up to and including volume 111 of the Pacific Reporter,
second series (1941), sixty-three cases were found deal-
"'tMeighan v. Baker, 119 Cal. App. 582, 6 P. (2d) 1015 (1932).
Howard v. Howard, 132 Cal. App. 124, 22 P. (2d) 279 (1933).
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ing directly with the question of wilful misconduct. In
eleven, directed verdicts or motions of nonsuit had been
granted." Five of these determinations were reversed by
the appellate courts, on the ground that the facts were for
the jury. Reversal occurred in all three appeals perfected
from judgments on demurrer."
In the remaining forty-nine cases the facts had been
found; by the jury in twenty-seven instances, and by the
trial court in twenty-two. Thirty-eight judgments were
for the plaintiff: twenty-one on jury verdicts; "e seven-
'
4 Nonsuits affirmed: Forsman v. Colton, 136 Cal. App. 97, 28 P. (2d)
429 (1933); Squiar v. McLean, 39 P. (2d) 437 (Cal. App. 1934); Horn v.
Volko, 57 P. (2d) 175 (Cal. App. 1936); Hall v. Mazzei, 57 P. (2d) 948
"(.Cal. App. 1936); McCann v. Hoffman, 62 P. (2d) 401 (Cal. App. 1936),
aff'd 70 P. (2d) 909 (Cal. 1937); Shipp v. Lough, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 820,
107 P. (24) 661 (1940).
Nonsuits reversed: Gieselman v. Uhlman, 45 P. (2d) 819 (Cal. App.
1935); Gimnez v. Rissen, 55 P. (2d) 292 (Cal. App. 1936); Frank v. Myers,
60 P. (2d) 144 (Cal. App. 1936) ; Erickson v. Vogt, 80 P. (2d) 533 (Cal. App.
1938); Marchi v. Virone, 42 'Cal. App. (2d) 124, 108 P. (2d) 469 (1941).
'Weber v. Pinyan, 61 P. (2d) 954 (Cal. App. 1936) ; Friswold v. Leahy,
60 P. (2d) 151 (Cal. App. 1936); Morris v. Duncan, 58 P. (2d) 669 (Cal.
App. 1936).
" Jury verdicts for plaintiff which were affirmed: Gibson v. Easley, 30
P. (2d) 70 (Cal. App. 1934) ; Olson v. Gay, 135 Cal. App. 726, 27 P. (2d) 922
(1934); Sanford v. Grady, 36 P. (2d) 652 (Cal.'App. 1934); modified, 37 P.
(2d) 475 (Cal. App. 1934) ; Browne v. Ferrandez, 140 Cal. App. 689, 36 P. (2d)
12-2 (1934) ; Walling v. Rugen, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 471, 39 P. (2d) 827 (1935);
Edwards v. Bodenhamer, 46 P. (2d) 202 (Cal. App. 1935); Candini'v. Hiatt,
50 P. (2d) 843 (Cal. App. 1935) ; Collins v. Nelson, 61 P. (2d) 479 (Cal. App.
1936); Petersen v. Petersen, 67 P. (2d) 759 (Cal. App. 1937); Chandler v.
Quinlan, 78 P. (24) 235 (Cal. App. 1938); Wright v. Sellers, 78 P. (2d)
209 (Cal. App. 1938) ; Francesconi v. Belluomini, 83 P. (2d) 298 (Cal. App.
1938); Madsen v. Cawthorne, 85 P. (2d) 909 (Cal. App. 1938); Hass v.
Jones, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 650, 85 P. (2d) 579 (1938); Hoffart v. Southern
Pacific Co., 92 P. (2d) 436 (Cal. App. 1939).
Jury verdicts for plaintiff which were reversed: Lennon v. Woodbury, 3
Cal. App. (2d) 595, 40 P. (2d) 292 (1935) ; Sparrer v. Kersgard, 85 P. (2d)
449 (Cal. 1938) ; Rode v. Roberts, 54 P. (2d) 498 (Cal. App. 1936) ; McLeod
v. Dutton, 57 P. (2d) 189 (Cal. App. 1936); Halter v. Malone, 53 P. (2d)
374 (Cal. App. 1935).
Reversed for error in charge: Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 2.3
P. (2d) 520 (1933).
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teen on court findings." Seventeen of these judgments
were reversed. Eleven of the court findings and five of the
jury verdicts were reversed because of the insufficiency of
the evidence to show wilful misconduct. The other reversal
was for error in the court's charge to the jury. There were
eleven judgments for the defendant: six on jury ver-
dicts; " five on court findings. 9  Motions for a new trial
were granted in two of the six cases in which the jury had
found a verdict for the defendant; these rulings were sus-
tained on appeal. In the other cases the judgments for the
defendant were affirmed.
There were, then, twenty-two rulings which, either by
" Court findings for plaintiff which were affirmed: Norton v. Puter, 138
Cal. App. 253, 32 P. (2d) 172 (1934); Barcroft v. Adkins, 44 P. (2d) 379
(Cal. App. 1935) ; Parsons v. Fuller, 66 P. (2d) 430 (Cal. App. 1937) ; Jones
v. Hathway, 70 P. (2d) 681 (Cal. App. 1937) ; Haggland v. Nelson, 73 P. (2d)
2635 (Cal. App. 1937) ; Rawlins v. Lory, 111 P. (2d) 973 (Cal. App. 1941).
Court findings for plaintiff which were reversed: Howard v. Howard,
22 P. (2d) 279 (Cal. App. 1933); Turner v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Cal. App.
t22, 25 P. (2d) 988 (1933) ; Horing v. Gerlach, 139 'Cal. App. 470, 34 P. (2d)
5M)4 (1934); Crawford v. Herzog, 40 P. (2d) 954 (Cal. App. 1935); Ceikin
v. Goldman, 42 P. (2d) 719 (Cal. App. 1935); Mfeek v. Fowler, 35 P. (2d)
410 (Cal. App. 1934), rev'd 45 P. (2d) 194 (Cal. 1935); Weir v. Lukes, 56
P. (2d) 987 (Cal. App. 193); Bartlett v. Jackson, 56 P. (2d) 1298 (Cal.
App. 1936); Porter v. Hofman, 78 P. (2d) 1025 (Cal. App. 1938), reiVd
Q5 P. (2d) 447 (Cal. 1938) ; Stacey v. Hayes, 88 P. (2d) 165 (Cal. App. 1939);
Spencer v. Scott, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 109, 102 P. (2d) 554 (1940).
" Newman v. Solt, 47 P. (2d) 289 (Cal. App. 1935) ; Rhodes v. Studley,
59J P. (2d) 1082 (Cal. App. 1936); Robertson v. Brown, 99 P. (2d) 288 (Cal.
App. 1940); Berryman v. Quinlan, 29 Cal. App. (2d3) 608, 85 P. (2dt) 202
(1938); Fisher v. Zimmerman, 73 P. (2d) 1243 (Cal. App. 1937). In the
last two cases motions for a new trial were affirmed.
In Broome v. Horn Valley Packing Co., 44 P. (2d) 430 (Cal. App. 1935)
there was no finding with respect to the defendant driver and a verdict of
...5,000 against the defendant corporation! This was affirmed.
' Do these figures suggest that a large proportion of guest cases are being
tried by courts and that the resulting judgments for defendants are not thereby
measurably increased? The five findings, all affirmed, were: Medberry v.
Olcovich, 59 P. (2d) 551 (Cal. App. 1936) ; Huddleston v. Pound, 68 P. (2d)
376 (Cal. App. 1937) ; Illingsworth v. Boyd, 36 P. (2d) 659 (Cal. App. 1934) ;
Del Bosque v. Kakoo Singh, 65 P. (2d) 951 (Cal. App. 1937); Volat v.
Tucker, 49 P. (2d) 337 (Cal. App. 1937).
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the direction of a verdict sustained in the appellate court,
or by a finding of insufficient evidence to show wilful mis-
conduct, declared that certain facts did not constitute wil-
ful misconduct. When this number is compared with the
five similar holdings in the cases on gross negligence, it is
clear that the legislature did accomplish a change in the
final result of guest cases by amending the statute. The
appellate courts recognized that their function went beyond
the mere creation of a definition to guide the jury and
called for the judicious exercise of their power to declare
the facts insufficient to show wilful misconduct."0
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARTICULATING STANDARDS
When the California legislature altered its guest statute
to make "wilful misconduct" the important phrase, the re-
sult sought to be accomplished in the final disposition of
cases was exactly the same as it was when the statute read
"gross negligence." Justice Andrews said:
"The legislative sense of fair play seems to have been shocked
by the perverted use of the law of negligence in guest cases to recover
indirectly against insurance companies by suits against indifferent and
irresponsible hosts; ifi some being a c6nsliracy between guest and
host against the insurance carrier." 2 1
In this connection it is interesting and important to observe the freedom
with which judgments on findings of trial courts were reversed because of
the insufficiency of the evidence to show "wilful misconduct" as compared with
judgments on the verdicts of juries. Judgments on eleven findings by trial
courts were reversed as compared with only five on jury verdicts. The number
is approximately the same in both situations if the motions for nonsuit which
were affirmed are added to the jury verdicts which were reversed for the in-
sufficiency of the evidence. But this does not seem an entirely satisfactory
explanation of the deference accorded jury verdicts in such cases.
' Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 23 P. (2d) 520 (1933).
"The Legislature . . . evidently had in mind the redress of an obvious
wrong, to wit, the readiness with which both driver and guest would pool
issues to exact tribute from an insurance company." Rocha v. Hulen, 44 P.
(2d) 478, 482. See also: Walker v. Adamson, 62 P. (2d) 199 (1936) at p.
201.
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Some of the courts recognized from their experience
with "gross negligence" that mere definition of "wilful
misconduct," unaccompanied by further court action,
would never accomplish the change which was sought. If
the matter should still be one entirely for the jury, as gross
negligence has been interpreted to be, then negligence,
gross negligence, and wilful misconduct would all be ap-
proximately the same thing so far as host liability to guests
was concerned. Whatever the phrase chosen, and what-
ever the definition given to this phrase by the courts, the
jury would continue to be plaintiff-minded. The problem
facing the courts was to determine what further court
action could be used which would produce the results in-
tended by the enactment of the guest statute.
The simple, age-old expedient of declaring that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support a finding of "wilful mis-
conduct" was seized upon by the appellate courts to re-
move clear cases from the control of the fact-finding body.
This did not occur, however, without serious objections.
TMr. Justice Sewell dissenting in the case of Spatter v.
Kersgard, said:
"To prevent the jury following what would seem to be a natural
interpretation of the statute in the mind of the average man it be-
comes necessary in this case, and it will be necessary in others, to
direct a verdict for the defendant or reverse the findings of the jury
in practically every case in which wilful misconduct is an issue." 22
'Sparrer v. Kersgard, 95 P. (2d) 449, 452 (Cal. 1938).
Notice also Mr. Justice Wood's dissent in Halter v. Malone where he says:
"The Constitution assigns to the Legislature the duty of enacting the laws
and to the jury the duty of passing upon the facts. The words 'wilful' and
'misconduct' are simple and are well understood by the citizenry. The Legisla-
ture would have provided an explanation of qualification of their use if such
had been deemed necessary. Manifestly the Legislature intended that the jury
in each case should determine what conduct on the part of a driver constitutes
wilful misconduct . . . By a reversal of the judgment the court substitutes its
own views of the evidence for that of the jury."
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Mr. Sewell could see clearly that an unconscionable
burden of cases would fall upon the appellate courts were
they to attempt to control the meaning of "wilful miscon-
duct" by removing certain cases from the consideration of
the jury. Each new fact situation would call for an appel-
late court determination of whether or not the facts could
constitute "wilful misconduct." This unquestionably
would be true unless the appellate courts should be willing
to relinquish some of their power to trial courts. The
issue, then, was between those courts which, believing
neither "gross negligence" nor "wilful misconduct" to be
capable of exact definition, held that the matter should be
left to the jury, 3 and the courts which believed that judi-
cious direction of verdicts could accomplish the purpose in-
tended by the legislature.4 Who has the responsibility for
' "How much care will, in a given case, relieve a party from the impu-
tation of gross negligence or what omission will amount to the charge, is
necessarily a question of fact, depending upon a great variety of circumstances
which the law cannot exactly define." Meighan v. Baker, 119 Cal. App. 582, 6
P. (2d) 1013 (1932).
"If we attempt too close an analysis, we find ourselves enmeshed in
metaphysics, psychiatry, psychology, and the thousand and one allied mazes
of mental speculation." Manica v. Smith, 18 P. (2d) 347 (,Cal. App. 1933).
"The distinction which some courts have attempted to draw between gross
negligence and wilful misconduct shades into faint lines. It seems absurd to
say that a person who wills to assume an obvious hazard is not guilty of wil-
ful misconduct. Certainly laymen are not able to see the fine distinctions
which courts are able to find -by the aid of the judicial microscope." Mr.
Justice Sewell dissenting in Sparrer v. Kersgard, 85 P. (2d) 449, 452 (Cal.
1938).
"Numerous attempts have been made to define 'wilful misconduct' without
any definitely satisfactory result." Mr. Justice Marks concurring in Walker
v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 23 P. (2d) 520 (1933).
" Sparrer v. Kersgard, 85 P. (2d) 449 (Cal. 1938); Seikin v. Goldman,
42 P. (2d) 719 (Cal. App. 1935).
"Two main problems were presented to the courts under said section.
The first was to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the term 'wilful miscon-
duct' as used therein. The second was to apply such definition to the facts and
to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of wilful
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articulating standards may make a great deal of difference.
The mere fact that verbal articulation is accomplished by
a reviewing court in a long opinion does not mean very
much. The important question is, who guides the final
disposition of the case? This seems rarely to result from
mere definition by appellate tribunals of the constituent
elements of "gross negligence" or "wilful misconduct."
They do not assume much responsibility for decisions un-
less in their administrative capacity they make their defini-
tions effective by the actual disposal of some of the cases
clearly not involving the elements required by the accepted
definitions.
Yet many appellate courts failed to realize that verbal
definition was not their only recourse in guiding trial
judges, that by more careful tactics their handling of ap-
peals could assume a plan or pattern which would be of
specific definitive significance. Such a pattern could de-
velop in the trial courts a sense of inclusion and exclusion
-a neat sense of factual discrimination. This seems to
have been in the mind of the Supreme Court in the case of
Porter v. Hofmzan," where it grouped and approved of the
decisions reached in a number of cases decided by different
courts of appeals.
A new conception of the purpose of definition, and of
the co6rdinate responsibility of appellate and trial courts,
may be taking form in the California cases dealing with
"wilful misconduct." Some courts of appeals now see
risconduct as opposed to mere negligence or even gross negligence. Neither
problem was free from difficulty."
"While it is true that each case must be determined on its particular facts,
it is necessarily true that wilful misconduct requires proof of conduct much
more reckless and flagrant than that which would constitute mere carelessness
or negligence . . . otherwise there would be no occasion for the adoption of
section 403 of the vehicle code." Spencer v. Scott, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 109,
102 P. (2d) 554, 556 (1940).
Porter v. Hofman, 85 P. (2d) 447 (Cal. 1938).
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that definition to be effective must be directed not to the
jury,- or the fact-finder, but to the trial court in its ad-
ministrative capacity. They see, further, that definition
should be supplemented by appellate-court approval of
factual situations which can guide trial courts in develop-
ing the factual discrimination necessary for the delicate
task of articulating general standards. At least the frame-
work has been constructed in California for inducing re-
sponsibility on the part of trial courts. What will be the
final outcome only the cases decided in the future can re-
veal.28
INSURANCE
All of the internal evidence in connection with guest
cases points to the conclusion that jurors are cognizant of
the fact that in most of these cases the real defendant is an
insurance company. An interesting bit of direct evidence
of this fact was observed in the case of O'Nellion v.
Haynes,27 where the plaintiff had suffered a paralysis of
half of the body. There one of the jurors propounded the
question, "you carry liability insurance don't you?" Be-
fore his counsel could object to the question, the defendant
answered, "I do." Although the jury was thoroughly ad-
monished by the court not to take the fact of insurance into
consideration, their verdict was for $25,000. It was held
by the appellate court that insurance was injected into the
' There seem to be fewer cases decided by the appellate courts on "wil-
ful misconduct" in the last few volumes of the reports. This might indicate
that trial courts are directing verdicts in appropriate cases. The chances are,
however, that the gains made will not be consolidated.
In cases involving gross negligence the rulings of the trial courts granting
motions for nonsuit were affirmed in four out of five cases involving such
motions. In wilful misconduct cases only six out of eleven of these judgments
were affirmed. This does not show any greater reliance on trial courts in
wilful misconduct cases than in gross negligence cases.
',O'Nellion v. Haynes, 122 Cal. App. 329, 9 P. (2d) 853 (1932). See
also: Godfrey v. Brown, 29 P. (2d) 165 (1934).
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case through no fault of counsel; and, since the verdict
was not excessive, the judgment should be affirmed.
It has already been shown that the "plaintiff-minded-
ness" of the jury has been counteracted to some extent by
the action of the appellate courts in holding, in many cases,
that the evidence was insufficient to show "wilful miscon-
duct." But in spite of this headway toward securing the
result sought by the legislature in the enactment of the
guest statute, other elements appear in the California cases
which make it questionable whether improper liability is
not still visited upon insurance companies. Thus, in clari-
fying the meaning of "wilful misconduct," the courts grad-
ually emphasized certain facts which if present with any
one or more of variety of other facts constituted "wilful
misconduct." Remonstrances on the part of the guest con-
cerning a course of conduct which later resulted in injury
to the guest is an illustration of one of these facts. Where
such remonstrances were shown coupled with such other
facts as speed, or sleepiness, or the like, the appellate courts
would say the facts were sufficient to show "wilful mis-
conduct."
Professor Bohlen has pointed out the danger involved
in relative definite standards of conduct.
"The second danger is that, in its endeavor to protect defend-
ants from the prejudice of juries, the court must by its decisions fix
standards of conduct so definite and precise as to give to unscrupu-
lous practitioners extraordinary opportunities for the successful
coaching of their witnesses." -8
There is little question that the testimony in the cases
studied revealed an astute understanding by witnesses of
the requirements necessary to sustain a showing of "wilful
misconduct." For instance, there was scarcely a single
case in which violent remonstrances by the guests did not
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) p. 601.
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appear. In addition, collusion between host and guest was
perfectly apparent-almost undisguised. Where this col-
lusion existed, the testimony of the defendant showed a
clear understanding of the factors involved in "wilful mis-
conduct." 2 Many cases said, significantly, "The facts are
not in dispute.""0
'In Meek v. Fowler, 45 P. (2d) 194 (Cal. 1935), 35 P. (2d) 410 (Cal.
App. 1934) the plaintiff (the defendant's sweetheart) had signed a written
statement just after the accident to the effect that the defendant was traveling
from 25 to 30 miles an hour and did his best to avoid the accident. At the
trial the plaintiff testified at variance to these statements. She attempted to
explain the written statements by saying she desired to protect the defendant
from a manslaughter charge in the event she died. Another guest testified
that -he had told the defendant to "take it easy" but he had nevertheless entered
the intersection between 40 and 50 miles an hour. A written statement signed
by this witness was received in evidence. It stated the speed of the defendant
on entering the intersection. to be from 15 to 20 miles an hour.
In Frank v. Myers, 60 P. (2d) 144 (1936) the defendant said she realized
that her conduct would probably result in injury to herself and guest and that
the accident was her fault. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
in this case probably sensing the unreliability of the defendant's testimony. The
case was reversed by the Court of Appeals and the question was said to be one
for the jury.
In Wright v. Sellers, 78 P. (2d) 209 (Cal. App. 1936) the defendant
testified when asked if the plaintiff said anything: "Just prior to the accident
he asked me to slow down." Also ". . . I was going down a slight grade
traveling about sixty miles an hour between sixty and sixty-five." When asked
why he could not make the turn he said he was going "too fast."
In Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 23 P. (2d) 520 (1933) both parties
were injured and neither was able to tell what happened. The defendant de-
scribed the road as having a high center, and narrow, with deep ditches on
either side. The defendant admitted he would not ordinarily drive over it in
excess of forty miles an hour, but he was driving around sixty. He also
testified the speedometer registered about ten per cent slow. The defendant's
son testified the steering knuckle of the car was very badly worn and that he
had told his father about this twice.
See also: Collins v. Nelson, 61 P. (2d) 479 (1936) at p. 482.
' "The facts are not in dispute." Porter v. Hofman, 85 P. (2d) 447, 448
(Cal. 1938). "There seems to be little dispute as to the facts of the case."
Chandler v. Quinlan, 78 P. (2d) 235, 235 (Cal. App. 1938). "The facts of
the case are not in serious dispute, except as to a few details." Wright v.
Sellers, 78 P. (2d) 209 (Cal. App. 1938).
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SELECTION OF FACTS IN THE ARTICULATION OF
STANDARDS
The theory was stated in several cases that where there
was substantial evidence to support the finding or verdict
in the trial court, it was unnecessary for the court of
appeals to set forth the facts of the case in rendering its
opinion."' This theory exhibits a common notion concern-
ing the function of a court of appeals with respect to the
evidence when articulating standards. Its duty is consid-
ered as merely supervisory; the importance of the facts in
connection with future cases is overlooked. The court in
Koeberle v. Hotchkiss says:
"To thresh through a reporter's transcript, and to then deter-
mine whether or not there is any substantial evidence, requires no
more skill than to thresh through a transcript and determine on
which side lies the greater weight of evidence. . . . It required a
somewhat lively imagination the first time the appellate court de-
clared that the search for and the determination whether there was
any evidence to support a finding was the determination of a question
of law. . . . We are attempting to point out how nearly this so-called
.question of law' approaches to being a question of fact. All of this
is in line with the thesis of this paragraph that this court purposely
refrains from setting out the facts and circumstances in evidence
upon which it bases its statements that there is substantial evidence
to support the implied findings of the jury." 32
If, as the court says, deciding whether there is sufficient
evidence to support a verdict or finding does approach a
question of fact, it would seem of great importance that
the facts upon which the court of appeals bases its opinion
should be stated. Suppose, for instance, that court should
say that driving at a high speed on a mountain road in the
SVolat v. Tucker, 49 P. (2d) 337 (Cal. App. 1935) ; Edwards v. Boden-
hamer, 46 P. (2d) 202 (Cal. App. 1935) ; Mledberry v. Olcovich, 59 P. (2d)
551 (Cal. App. 1936).
'Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 43 P. (2d) 104, 106 (Cal. App. 1935).
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face of remonstrances by guests furnished sufficient evi-
dence of wilful misconduct to send the case to the jury.
The "elemental" facts do aid later courts in determining
the limits of the doctrine of wilful misconduct.
If, as these courts seemed to think, there is no necessity
for *a statement of the facts upon which the appellate de-
cision is based, why did they write opinions? The verbal
definition of the phrase "wilful misconduct" was well set-
tled at the time, and yet the opinions consisted entirely of
definitional quotations from earlier leading cases. The
court in the Hotchkiss case goes on to say:
"Such a recitation of the evidence makes the same a part of
the case law, much to the confusion of professors in law schools,
their pupils, and others. Such practice takes time and makes for
long opinions when brevity in opinions is demanded as a cardinal
virtue second only to clearness." 8
The confusion which this court says arises from a reci-
tation of the evidence is a confusion which comes when
several decisions are compared, some holding the question
to be one for the jury, others holding approximately the
same question to be one for a nonsuit or a directed verdict.
This comparison of facts brings the realization that what
is in reality a different standard is being applied in differ-
ent courts. No plan or pattern for the cases is observable.
The absence of a plan is probably due to the lack of any
uniform thought among appellate courts with respect to
the standard which is being defined. The neat sense of
factual discrimination necessary to articulate broad stand-
ards is absent.
Where, however, the trial court has directed a verdict
for the defendant, and the court of appeals reverses this
judgment, then the judge who wrote the opinion in the
Supra note 32 at p. 106.
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Hotchkiss case thinks the facts should be stated in the
opinion of the court of appeals. This judge said, in a sub-
sequent case:
"We have reviewed the record and believe the plaintiff's con-
tention should be sustained and the judgment reversed. Because we
believe the judgment should be reversed, we shall set forth the facts
and circumstances in evidence somewhat in detail (a task which
the writer of this opinion ordinarily does not deem necessary or
efficient where the judgment of the trial court is to be affirmed)." "
This position seems inconsistent with that taken in the
Hotchkiss case. The action of the court in both cases con-
sists of a holding that the question is one for the jury. So
far as future cases are concerned the need for a recitation
of the facts is no greater in the one than in the other.
Not only are some of the reviewing courts reluctant to
state the facts where they hold that there is evidence suffi-
cient to sustain a finding of wilful misconduct, but they
also refuse to consider the facts of other cases in which a
like result was reached. In several instances counsel, rec-
ognizing the importance of facts, made an extensive re-
view of the cases involving wilful misconduct, pointing out
the general factual similarities between the cases before
the court and the cases already decided. Yet several ap-
pellate courts refused to place any weight upon such a
review of the cases.35 The court in McCann v. Hoffman
said:
"It would serve no useful purpose to review the facts in the
cited cases or other cases on this subject, as it has been frequently
stated that each case must stand upon the particular facts involved
therein."
SGieselman v. Uhlman, 45 P. (2d) 819, 819 (-Cal. App. 1935).
: "It must be borne in mind, of course, that the interpretation to be given
actions and conduct must turn on the circumstances of the individual case, and
that decisions passing upon facts constituting or failing to constitute, wilful
misconduct, can be of little assistance, other than to announce the definition of
that term." lkfedberry v. Olcovich, 59 P. (2d) 551, 553 (Cal. App. 1936).
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But this same court found its thinking inescapably con-
nected with previous decisions, for it concluded the above
quotation by saying:
"We may state, however, that the showing made here was not
as strong as that made in McLeod v. Dutton, supra, in which this
court reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff." 36
The Supreme Court of California, as already pointed
out, felt it necessary to explain the cases which had held
that the evidence warranted a finding of wilful misconduct.
Attempting in Porter v. Hofman to fit the case before it
into the pattern of prior determinations dealing with the
problem, it reasoned:
"There is here no conscious reckless disregard of their safety
as was involved in cases such as those relied upon by the plaintiffs
* . .and which led to the conclusion therein that the evidence war-
ranted a finding that wilful misconduct had occurred."
The whole picture is filled out when the court continues:
"Similarly in other cases, some of which are cited below, the
facts failed to reveal misconduct on the part of defendants within
the meaning of the approved definition and the courts unhesitatingly
reversed judgments or orders favorable to the plaintiffs therein." 3'
In making a selection of the cases decided by the courts
of appeals and placing them in two distinct classes, the
Supreme Court made it easier for trial courts to make the
factual discrimination necessary in deciding whether the
facts showed wilful misconduct when viewed most favor-
ably toward the plaintiff."'
-62 P. (2d) 401, 402 (Cal. App. 1936), aff'd 70 P. (2d) 909 (Cal. 1937).
- 85 P. (2d) 447, 449 (Cal. 1938).
' In Parsons v. Fuller, 66 P. (2d) 430, 431 (Cal. 1937) the Supreme Court
said: "A reading of the present opinion of the District Court of Appeals we
think will show an entirely different course of conduct on the part of the
defendant in this case and that his acts persisted in for some hours and over
many miles of travel, after repeated protests on the part of his guest, and
while they were traveling over a mountain road with frequent curves and at
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If appellate courts treat the question before them as
substantially similar to the action of a trial court in direct-
ing a verdict, no progress will be made toward defining a
standard such as wilful misconduct. The act of directing
a verdict and that of determining on appeal whether there
is substantial evidence in the record to support a verdict
are analogous." But directing a verdict does not have the
great normative significance which attaches to the act of
an appellate court in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence. This difference is frequently overlooked.
Even if this distinction be clearly recognized by the
appellate courts, other obstacles remain in the path of a
proper selection of facts for their articulation of stand-
ards. Thus it cannot be said that they always have a
correct mental picture of the facts as they were presented
in the trial court. In Hoffart v. Southern Pacific Co.,"0
the court of appeals had to admit that it had misread the
record to the extent that it pictured a truck approaching a
crossing on a road paralleling the railroad tracks, when as
a matter of fact the road ran at a distinct angle to the
tracks. The court nevertheless felt that this misconstruc-
tion of the evidence was inconsequential.
an excessive rate of speed, compel the conclusion that he was guilty of wilful
mi. conduct within the settled meaning of that term as defined by the authorities,
many of which are cited in said opinion."
This type of opinion has been copied in other cases. Spencer v. Scott, 39
Cal. App. (2d) 10R, 102 P. (2d) 554 (1940); Shipp v. Lough, 41 Cal. App.
(2d) 820, 107 P. (2d) 661 (1940).
" Collins v. Nelson, 61 P. (2d) 479 (Cal. App. 1936).
92 P. (2d) 4 36 (Cal. App. 1939). In the petition for rehearing, page
444, the court said: "We stated that the road which was traversed by the
truck paralleled the railroad and then turned to the right and crossed the track.
The record shows that the road does not run parallel to the track, but ap-
proaches the track in a straight line at an angle of 40 degree. The state high-
way parallels the railroad on the opposite side of the track. It would appear,
however, that the inaccuracy mentioned was more favorable to appellants than
the correction which we here make."
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A more substantial change in the facts was made on a
rehearing in Sanford v. Grady." Here the court had said,
"Richard Steger was familiar with this road and knew of
the depression therein." On rehearing the following was
added by the court, "although he had not traveled that
road for four years he claimed that he did not remember
the exact location of the depression. He said in that re-
gard, 'I did not know it was so close.' " The court also
had stated, "There is no doubt that with knowledge on
his part of the presence of the declivity in the roadway...
he deliberately attempted to pass the truck in reckless dis-
regard of the safety of his passenger." On rehearing the
words, "of the presence of" were taken out and in lieu
thereof was added, "that he was in the vicinity." Yet, if
this had been the appellate court's first impression of the
facts its holding might have been substantially different.
There is also exhibited great difficulty in fairly review-
ing the record. A dissenting judge will give a different
statement of the evidence or will emphasize evidence that
other judges think of little importance."2 Also, the court of
appeals will select certain facts as the salient ones, while
the Supreme Court will emphasize others. Where a car
traveling down a six per cent grade at forty-ive miles an
hour on a wet slippery pavement had previously skidded,
and thereafter an accident occurred when the driver turned
and looked at persons in the back seat of the car, a court
of appeals held there was sufficient evidence to support a
4136 P. (2d) 652 (Cal. App. 1934), Modified on reargument, 37 P. (2d)
475 ( Cal. App. 1934). See also, Spencer v. Scott, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 109, 102
P. (2d) 554, 557 (1940) where the court when it rendered its opinion thought
the vehicle ahead was a bus whereas on the petition for rehearing the court
had to state it was not a bus but an automobile.
"Meek v. Fowler, 35 P. (2d) 410, 521 (-Cal. App. 1934).
"In order to make my position clear, it is necessary to further review some
of the facts of the case which are not particularly emphasized in the opinion
of my associate." Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 23 P. (2d) 520 (1933).
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finding of wilful misconduct.4" Yet the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment, holding that the facts fell far short
of evidencing wilful misconduct. In its view: "The car
skidded slightly twice on the wet pavement but apparently
not dangerously..."; "There is no evidence that at any
time the speed of the car exceeded 45 miles an hour...";
and "It was in evidence that similar accidents on that part
of the road were not unusual, eight having occurred in the
six weeks preceding the accident involved, and a number
prior to that period." "
CONCLUSION
A tentative conclusion upon the evidence presented by
the cases studied is that fact-finding bodies, be they juries
or trial courts,' do not follow appellate court definitions
intended for their guidance in applying, to the facts before
them, general standards of law. They are inclined, rather,
to apply their own notions of justice. If this is true, one
of the causes of the successful emasculation of trial courts
during the last century can be understood.46 The willing-
"3 Porter v. Hofman, 78 P. (2d) 1023 (Cal. App. 1938).
"Porter v. Hofman, 85 P. (2d) 447, 448 (Cal. 1938).
' When "gross negligence" was the standard, notice that there was only
one finding for the defendant by the trial courts, but there were four jury
verdicts for the defendant. Also of interest is the fact that when "wilful mis-
conduct" was made the standard there were six verdicts by the jury for the
defendant as compared with five findings by the court for the defendant.
Finally, notice that in cases dealing with "wilful misconduct" five jury verdicts
were reversed because of the insufficiency of the evidence, while eleven court
findings were reversed on this ground. This evidence taken together seems
of value.
'""With few exceptions, practically every change in trial procedure in
America during the nineteenth century meant more and more determination by
the jury and less and less control by the trial judge, and in so far as trial
courts in most states are concerned it probably is still true that juries exercise
a dominant power in those cases in which they participate except in so far as
trial judges exercise power by the grace of appellate courts." GREEN, JuDGE
AND JURY (1930) p. 379.
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ness of appellate courts to rely upon mere definition di-
rected to the fact-finder, unsupplemented by rules guiding
trial courts in directing verdicts, has removed almost every
vestige of trial-court control over the development of gen-
eral standards. Where the standard to be articulated is
simple and expressive of the common opinion of mankind,
no great harm may result. The jury would normally reach
the result required by the standard in question. Where,
however, the standard diverges from this common opin-
ion,4" or is technical or complicated, the authority of the
trial court must be reinstated or appellate courts must carry
an extremely heavy load of cases. 8
One of the most striking things observed in the cases
studied was the ease with which a fairly comprehensive
definition was settled upon in the early decisions, to be
reiterated in succeeding cases.4' The ridiculous reliance of
courts upon definitions is illustrated by one case in which
seventy folios of typewritten manuscript were required for
'TIn Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co., 44 P. (2d) 430 (Cal. App. 1935)
the jury failed to find against the defendant driver, but brought in a verdict
of $5,000 against the defendant corporation. It was argued that the verdict
was "self-stultifying and inconsistent." The court affirmed the judgment, say-
ing, "There is no good reason why a failure to find against the one should
release the other . . ." and "appellant here waived his right . . . by failing to
ask the jury be sent back to complete its verdict . . ."
"The average juror apparently cannot decide cases on the evidence. He
cannot see the cause as the primary element nor come near doing so in the
great majority of cases. It cannot be true that corporations are wrong 90 per
cent of the time." Kingdom, True Verdicts, (1940) 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 190.
'Sixty-three cases on "wilful misconduct" alone, in such a short time,
indicates a high price is being paid for appellate court control. The small part
played -by the trial court is shown by the fact that out of the one hundred and
three cases on "gross negligence" and "wilful misconduct" the granting of a
motion for nonsuit was affirmed in only ten cases. Considering the nature of
the standard in question this number seems very small.
" "Gross negligence" defined in Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 Pac. 62
(1930). "Wilful misconduct" defined in Howard v. Howard, 22 P. (2d) 979
(Cal. App. 1933) and in Turner v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Cal. App. 622, 25 P.
(2d) 988 (1933).
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the instructions; and yet in the eyes of the appellate courts,
"Seldom has a record come before us which shows so much
care on the part of the trial judge." " A false sense of
security, of certainty, seems to prevail after two or three
courts have created a definition. Witness the statement
that, "'Wilful misconduct' has been so frequently defined
in recent decisions that its definition cannot now be re-
garded as in doubt." "' Inefficiency and irresponsibility on
the part of both trial and appellate courts is the conse-
quence of such appellate court dependence upon the de-
lusive control given by the right to define. Definition is
but an aspect of successful articulation of general stand-
ards by appellate courts; and it is one of the simpler
aspects.
This attitude may also explain the lack of interest in
the holdings of other states. Very few cases were cited
from other jurisdictions; they were said to be "of slight
value since predicated on statutory definitions different
from our own." "  It is nevertheless true that the guest
statutes of other states were intended to accomplish the
same result intended by the California legislature. Con-
sidered as a problem of defining a specific statutory stand-
ard, the work of the courts with respect to guest statutes
is easier, and hence more appealing, than when viewed as
a problem of procuring a specified result.
The fate suffered by the "gross negligence" statute at
the hands of the California courts exhibits a reluctance
upon the part of appellate courts to accept responsibility
for articulating standards in a way which will be effective
in the disposition of cases. An aversion on the part of
Browne v. Fernandez, 140 Cal. App. 689, 36 P. (2d) 122 (1934).
1 Meek v. Fowler, 35 P. (2d) 410 (Cal. App. 1934), rev'd, 45 P. (2d) 194
(Cal. 1935).
"2Walters v. DuFour, 22 P. (2d) 259, 262 (Cal. App. 1933) ; Illingsworth
v. Boyd, 36 P. (2d) 659 (Cal. App. 1934).
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appellate courts to concentrating any part of the power of
decision in trial courts also appears. However, the atti-
tude of some of the courts in construing the phrase "wilful
misconduct" indicates that it is possible for the legislature
to make its intention so well known that the courts will
revise their normal procedures to effect the realization of
that intention. Yet the part which the trial court is sup-
posed to take in this revised procedure has been poorly out-
lined. If the discussions found in the opinions on "gross
negligence" and "wilful misconduct" are any criterion, it
is manifest that the courts do not understand clearly the
nature of the task which is theirs when they attempt to
articulate general standards of conduct.
That difficult task is the development of guides for trial
courts in directing verdicts. This requires conscious effort
on the part of the appellate court to find a basis for classi-
fication of the cases. They must be fitted into a pattern
with a clear indication of the factual elements which make
it appropriate to classify them one way or the other. This
will call for careful analysis and statement of the facts,
regardless of the final disposition which the appellate court
makes of the case.
In order to create a pattern for the cases it should not
be necessary for the appellate court to write opinions in
very many cases. The importance of the problem involved
and the effectiveness with which careful appellate super-
vision can accomplish greater justice should be dominant
considerations in determining this question. For example,
"wilful misconduct" cases could be handled quickly and
fairly by trial courts if these courts were given the key by
one or two appellate court opinions and urged to exercise
a wider discretion in directing verdicts than they otherwise
would dare to. The line between wilful misconduct and neg-
ligence is not a line which will ever be drawn with preci-
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sion.S Frequent opinions defining wilful misconduct cause
delay without contributing very much to the predictability
of the law on the subject.
The framework for the cases should be designed so that
it will delineate for the trial court the general sphere within
which it can, without fear of reversal, make a determina-
tion of the facts for the purpose of securing decision ac-
cording to established norms. This will require radical
revision of common conceptions concerning the function
of a motion for a directed verdict.
"Notwithstanding the difficulty of drawing the line 'between negligence
and reckless conduct, these differences make it advisable to treat the two sub-
jects separately." RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 282, special note.
"The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only
such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in
the degree of risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount
substantially to a difference in kind." RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) § 500,
comment g.
